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Abstract
Hospitals that join a pricing database are able to reduce the negotiated prices they pay to medical technology
companies. Reductions are concentrated among hospitals previously paying high prices relative to other
hospitals and for products purchased in relatively large volumes. Transparency may offer significant savings on
medical devices.
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KEY FINDINGS: 
Hospitals that join a pricing database are able to reduce the negotiated prices they pay to medical technology companies. 
Reductions are concentrated among hospitals previously paying high prices relative to other hospitals and for products 
purchased in relatively large volumes. Transparency may offer significant savings on medical devices.
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largest purchase volumes; they saved about $70 per stent.  
These price effects are driven by increased likelihood of 
renegotiation and by larger price decreases when hospitals 
renegotiate. The findings suggest that benchmarking works 
by solving the asymmetric information problem and helping 
hospitals learn about suppliers; its effect on the relationship 
between hospitals and their negotiators is less clear.
Overall, by obtaining this price information, hospitals 
were able to achieve 26 percent of the savings that would 
have occurred if prices were set at the average level. 
The benchmarking database provided hospitals with 
information to help them identify high-volume products 
for which they were paying higher than average prices 
and could see significant savings in a renegotiation. 
THE IMPLICATIONS
Price transparency has been discussed as a way to reduce 
consumer health expenditures, but these new findings shed 
light on how transparency can change business-to-business 
negotiations, which are relatively opaque. The study 
demonstrates the potential for information transparency 
to reduce variation in the cost of medical devices across 
hospitals. The potential savings are significant, since 
THE QUESTION
How does price transparency affect negotiated prices 
in business-to-business markets? In the first empirical 
analysis of its kind, LDI Senior Fellows Ashley Swanson 
and Matthew Grennan estimate how benchmarking 
information could be useful to hospital buyers in their 
negotiations with medical technology companies. They 
explore two mechanisms for possible savings: first, by 
reducing “asymmetric information” about seller bargaining 
parameters (that is, not knowing the lowest price a seller 
would accept); and second, by helping hospitals solve the 
“agency problem” with their procurement negotiators (that 
is, allowing hospitals to monitor negotiator performance 
and restructure financial incentives). Taking coronary stents 
as their example, the authors look at whether hospitals that 
join a price benchmarking database, which contains average 
pricing based on data submitted by member hospitals, 
can achieve savings in future negotiations with suppliers. 
THE FINDINGS
The authors find that price transparency led to lower prices 
for hospitals in the upper quintile of price for a given 
product; they saved about $30 per stent. Furthermore, 
price reductions were greater for hospitals with the
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since hospital supplies have accounted for a quarter of the 
growth in hospital inpatient costs in recent years.
Policymakers have called for greater transparency in 
medical technology markets, and intermediaries offering 
benchmarking data have emerged. The authors focused 
on coronary stents as an example of the high-tech, high-
dollar “physician preference items” at the center of policy 
discussions regarding health care costs and transparency of 
device pricing. Hospitals spend about $2 billion annually 
on stents (about 2 percent of hospital supply spending). 
Information transparency could extend to other expensive 
product categories, such as orthopedics, which see high 
price variation across facilities.
THE STUDY
The authors analyzed 2009-2014 ECRI Institute data for 
hospital purchase orders for coronary stents at 508 hospital 
facilities (16 percent of U.S. hospitals) that perform cardiac 
catheterization services. The dataset exists because sample 
hospitals subscribed to a voluntary price-benchmarking 
database between 2009-14.  
The database provided hospitals with access to monthly 
submissions made by other member hospitals about the 
prices and quantities of each item they purchased. Upon 
joining, new member hospitals were asked to submit 
retrospective price and quantity data for the past 12 months. 
This allowed the authors to look at the impact of database 
membership on price and quantity when new products enter 
the market, comparing hospitals with or without access to 
the benchmarking information. 
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